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CASENOTE
FREEMAN v. PITTS: A RETHINKING OF PUBLIC SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 1992, the United States Supreme Court unanimously de-
clared that federal district courts have the authority to relinquish super-
vision and control of a public school desegregation plan in incremental
stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school-
operations.' The Court also held that public school districts have no duty
to remedy racial imbalance caused by demographic shifts once the ves-
tiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated. 2 Reversing a lower
court's ruling, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that the
decision was consistent with the Court's duties to both remedy constitu-
tional violations and to restore control of a public school system to state
and local authorities.' The Supreme Court's ruling in Freeman v. Pitts4
may well have whittled away much of the high ground that has been
gained in the area of public school desegregation.
Namely, once a school district has achieved a certain degree of compli-
ance with court-ordered desegregation plans, federal courts will now be
permitted to withdraw judicial supervision and control.5 The Freeman
Court responded primarily to the effect of demographic change6 and ren-
dered a holding allowing for a piecemeal unitary standard.7 For the mil-
l. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1436 (1992).
2. Id. at 1447.
3. Id. at 1445 (citing, Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)) ("[T]he federal
courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authori-
ties in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution.")
4. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
5. Id. at 1436.
6. Id. at 1448.
7. Id. at 1444. The term "unitary" is generally understood to describe a school system
that is in total compliance with the constitutional ban on legally mandated segregation of
public education. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 636 (1991); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968).
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lions of American racial minorities, especially African-Americans, the
Court's holding in Freeman has the potential of emasculating years of
progress in equal educational opportunity inspired by Brown v. Board of
Education' and its progeny.
Through the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress abol-
ished slavery in 1865,9 thus freeing thousands of African-Americans from
the brutal chains which had bound them since the mid-fifteenth century.
By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868, Congress
had theoretically included African-American citizens in the American ide-
ology "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.'1°0 As history has proved, however, the in-
humanity of racial discrimination was not eliminated with the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment. When the Supreme Court held that "sepa-
rate but equal" was the law of the land in Plessy v. Ferguson," African-
Americans were forced to live, learn, work and socialize in an America
that was characteristically "separate and unequal.""s
Plessy v. Ferguson remained intact until 1954 when the Supreme Court
again tackled the issue of racial discrimination in public education. With
its landmark holding in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court declared
that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place."13 Unfortunately, the promises of Brown remain largely un-
fulfilled today. Countless public educational systems in the United States
remain segregated, despite the emphasis the Court placed on education as
a means for employment opportunity and social mobility:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an op-
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12. "Our Nation, I fear, will be ill served by the Court's refusal to remedy separate and
unequal education, for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that
our people will ever learn to live together." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974)
(Milliken I) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
13. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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portunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.
14
Employment opportunity and social mobility in today's expanding
global economy require training and education. If African-Americans and
other racial minorities are to achieve the American Dream, educational
equality must remain at the forefront of national policy. 15 As one well-
respected African-American educator has stated, African-American high
school students, particularly those in America's inner cities, often have no
idea that a quality education is available to them.' Once youngsters are
exposed to the opportunities that a quality education can provide, their
lives have been and can continue to be dramatically altered for the
better.'7
In an effort to provide an historical perspective into the vexing issue of
public school desegregation, Part II of this Note examines the history of
desegregation in American public schools under the framework of leading
desegregation cases.'8 If the courts are empowered with the authority to
allow public school districts to determine their own destiny regarding the
course of desegregation, then African-Americans and other similarly situ-
ated racial minorities may face the dismal prospect of losing much of the
ground that has been gained in both equal employment and educational
opportunity since the mid-1960s.
Part III continues with an analysis of the Freeman decision and the
role federal courts must now assume when supervising school desegrega-
tion programs, the effect of Freeman on public school districts, and the
mechanics of federal court withdrawal."" Finally, Part IV provides a fore-
cast of the future as Americans from all political camps attempt to grap-
ple with the Freeman decision.'0
14. Id. at 493.
15. One court wrote:
It would be ironic if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial
injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been excluded from the
American Dream for so long' constituted the first legislative prohibition of all volun-
tary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segrega-
tion and hierarchy.
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing 110 Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
16. BILL MoYEns, A WORLD OF IDEAs 78 (1989) (a conversation with Dr. William Julius
Wilson, a prominent African-American professor of sociology at the University of Chicago).
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 21-59 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 60-101 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 102-123 and accompanying text.
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II. A HISTORY OF DESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Freeman v. Pitts began in 1968 as a class action suit filed by African-
American school children and their parents residing in DeKalb County,
Georgia." The plaintiffs alleged that the DeKalb County School System
(DCSS) was unconstitutionally segregated on the basis of race.22 In 1969,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia en-
tered a consent order approving a plan.to eliminate de jure segregation
from the school system.2" The federal court retained jurisdiction to super-
vise and control implementation of the plan.24
In 1986, the DCSS filed for dismissal seeking a declaratory judgment
that DCSS had achieved unitary status.25 The district court found that
DCSS had achieved unitary status with regard to four of the six factors
identified in Green v. New Kent County School Board:26 student assign-
ments, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facili-
ties.'7 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding, inter
alia, that a district court should retain supervisory control over a school
system until the school system achieves unitary status in all Green cate-
gories at the same time for several years.' s
The Supreme Court's decision in Freeman v. Pitts is likely to have far
reaching effects for both civil rights activists, who favor a tightening of
judicial control over school desegregation matters, and political conserva-
tives, who advocate a return of desegregation supervision to state and lo-
cal school board administrators. Thirty-nine years after the Supreme
Court held in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)'" that separate but
equal in public education was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,' 0 many public schools in America
continue to be racially segregated.' 1
21. Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 887 F.2d 1438, 1440 (11th Cir.
1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1442-43.
24. Id.
25. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1435-36. See also supra note 7.
26. Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
27. Id. at 1437.
28. Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. The issue of race in public education continues to generate heated debate, whether
the dialogue centers on the inclusion of minority perspectives on the design of new curric-
ula, the longstanding desegregation orders in school busing curricula cases, or the use of
scholarships specifically targeted to minority group students. Arguably, the Supreme Court
has shown an increasing aversion toward race-conscious remedies designed to overcome dis-
crimination in employment, housing and public education.
[Vol. 27:399
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As politicians, school board administrators, civil rights activists, and or-
dinary citizens continue to wrestle with America's ongoing war against
racism and public school segregation, recent developments in education
and in the federal courts have critically challenged Brown I's central
theme.12 Brown's I's conclusion that separate but equal has no place in
public education relied heavily on sociological data which indicated that
African-American children in segregated schools were inherently stigma-
tized with "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.'
33
The Court's decision in Brown I ushered in an era of unprecedented
control and supervision by federal courts over public school districts en-
gaging in state-imposed segregation. Since Milliken v. Bradley,34 the
Court has backed away from taking an affirmative role in eliminating the
vestiges of decades of segregated public education. The Court's general
reluctance to take a positive stand on school desegregation issues has
most recently been reflected in Board of Education v. Dowell,35 which
centered around the issue of court-ordered busing, and the present deci-
sion, Freeman v. Pitts.36
The historical relevance of the Brown I decision, ending state-sanc-
tioned segregation, and its impact on constitutional analysis, has been
firmly established in American case law.3 7 By removing the stamp of state
approval from public school segregation, the Court may well have rea-
32. The Supreme Court held "that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'sepa-
rate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" and
therefore violative of "equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. As of 1980, in spite of Brown I, two-thirds of all African-
American children attended public schools where over half of the students were members of
minority groups. COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF BLACK AMERICANS, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 76 (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin
M. Williams, Jr., eds. 1989) [hereinafter COMMON DESTINY].
33. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. While the Court's reliance on sociological data continues to be
controversial, several recent studies have shown that while some African-American children
benefit from attending previously all-white schools, others actually perform worse because of
discriminatory programs and negative attitudes fostered by white administrators and teach-
ers. See Kenneth B. Clark, A Personal View of the Background and Developments Since
the Brown Decision, in BROWN PLUS THIRTY: PERSPECTIVE ON DESEGREGATION 18 (LaMar P.
Miller ed., 1986).
34. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that a multi-district remedy for school desegregation,
such as busing children across district lines, can only be ordered by a federal court when
there has been a finding that all the districts involved have been responsible for the segrega-
tion to be remedied).
35. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991) (allowing a desegregation decree concerning busing to be dis-
solved if racial desegregation has been achieved).
36. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
37. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III. FROM
BROWN TO BAKKE (1979).
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soned that, with time, African-American school children would no longer
be stigmatized by attending separate schools characterized by inadequate
facilities and resources. Instead, African-American students would receive
better educational opportunities in a racially integrated environment.
Brown I signaled the end of apartheid in America by granting full na-
tional citizenship status to millions of African-Americans, who were pre-
viously relegated to second-class citizen roles as a result of earlier Su-
preme Court cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford 3  and Plessy v.
Ferguson.3 9 However, since the mid-1970s, desegregation efforts in the
area of equal education opportunity have been severely limited.40 Efforts
to desegregate public schools have been met with widespread opposition,
such as "white flight" from cities and an enormous displacement of Afri-
can-American teachers and administrators. 41 Hundreds of public school
desegregation cases continue to crowd federal court dockets, and state
and national legislators have recently advocated a move to bring this liti-
gation to a close.42
Political conservatives argue that Brown has given rise to the resegrega-
tion of America's public schools by promoting racial integration rather
than simple desegregation - that is, racial balance as opposed to a color-
blind approach to educational opportunity. 43 Also, advocates of public
school desegregation, who once believed that the prohibition of de jure
segregated education would eventually materialize into equal educational
38. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also C. TSEHLOANE KETo, THE AFRICA-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE
OF HISTORY 25-28 (1989). Brown I not only provided substantial authority for the prohibi-
tion of segregation in a wide spectrum of public services, but also provided the legal founda-
tion for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because of Brown I's profound effect, evidenced by the
enactment of significant several civil rights legislation, millions of minority-group citizens
have been successfully assimilated into the mainstream of American life.
40. See, e.g., COMMON DESTINY, supra note 32, at 75-84.
41. See Robert L. Gill, Brown II v. Board of Education of Topeka: Its Human Advances
and Human Tragedies, 1955-1980, 32 NEGRO EDuc. REV. 15, 39 (1981). The term "white
flight" refers to the mass migration of white families from urban areas to suburban commu-
nities to avoid sending their children to newly integrated public schools. See also DERRICK
A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 109 (1987). Pro-
fessor Bell explains that "[w]hen districts finally admitted more than a token number of
black students to previously white schools, the action usually resulted in closing black
schools, dismissing black teachers and demoting (and often degrading) black principals." Id.
42. Former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, and their supporters, were fer-
vent in their efforts to end judicial supervision of public education desegregation. These
administrations have argued before the courts that judicial supervision and control should
end once public school districts have complied with desegregation decrees for a specified
period of time. See Paul Gerwitz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the
Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 798 (1986).
43. See THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY 65-69 (1984).
[Vol. 27:399
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opportunity for all Americans, now acknowledge that the goal of Brown I
has not been fully achieved."'
When the Supreme Court reached its decision in Brown II,45 it was at-
tempting to give America a chance to adapt to the way things would be in
the future. The Brown II decision was met with heavy resistance as state
and local legislators and school administrators continued to oppose na-
tional desegregation efforts.
46
Some states adopted the "freedom of choice" plan proposed by Briggs
v. Elliott,47 which permitted students in certain grades to choose, on an
annual basis, schools they would attend; those not choosing were assigned
to the school previously attended. However, in Green v. County School
Board,4 the Court disapproved Briggs' "freedom of choice" plan. In
Green, the Court ruled that school boards were "charged with the affirm-
ative duty" to see that "racial discrimination. . . [is] eliminated root and
branch."' 9
In Keyes v. School District No. 1,50 the Court once again tackled the
issue of school desegregation by holding that a school board has the bur-
den of proving that its "racially neutral" neighborhood school policy was
not motivated by an intent to segregate. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Board of Education51 directed public school officials to "eliminate
invidious racial distinctions" in the quality of school facilities, faculty
44. See Robert L. Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Back-
ward into the Future, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 615, 620 (1979). For example, "[b]lack
children in 1980 made up about one-fifth of the nation's public elementary and secondary
enrollment, but almost two-thirds of them went to schools in which more than one-half of
the students were minorities." COMMON DESTINY, supra note 32, at 76.
45. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II). In Brown II, the Court held
that efforts to desegregate American public schools must be done "with all deliberate
speed." Id. at 301. This phrase has been the subject of widespread controversy as many
public school districts, especially those in the South, balked at the Court's order.
46. See, e.g., Griffin v. Prince Edward County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that
closing all public schools in the county and contributing to the support of the private white
schools that took their place to avoid desegregation was unconstitutional); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that the Little Rock, Arkansas, school board could not delay a
desegregation plan).
47. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955). Briggs was one of the original companion cases to
Brown I and held that the Constitution does not require integration, but rather prohibits
racial discrimination. The court reasoned that Americans still had the "freedom to choose"
which schools their children attended. Id.
48. 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
49. Id. at 437-38.
50. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Even where a school district was partially segregated on a de
facto basis rather than through de jure, the Court remained committed to the idea of uni-
tary school districts.
51. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (declaring that the authority of federal courts to construct equi-
table remedies is "broad").
19931
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compositions and extracurricular activities.2 After Swann, federal courts
began imposing more stringent desegregation plans such as mandatory
busing and the use of racially-balanced student body compositions. The
net effect of the Court's ruling in Keyes, combined with its decision in
Swann, was to provide district courts with the authority to order busing
to the degree necessary to desegregate public school districts effectively.
Progress in public school desegregation began to wane with the Court's
1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley.5 3 The Court held that a multi-dis-
trict remedy for school desegregation, such as busing school children
across district lines, can only be ordered by a federal court when the court
has found that all the districts involved were responsible for the segrega-
tion remedied. Before the Milliken decision, the Court had not reversed a
single school desegregation order that provided for declaratory relief since
its ruling in Brown.
54
Likewise, the Court's recent decision in Board of Education v. Dowell55
further illustrates the Court's reluctance to address the inherent dangers
of school board policies designed to resegregate public schools as a result
of shifting demographics. The Dowell holding emphasizes that once a fed-
eral court declares a school district unitary, the school district is no
longer required to be under any further court supervision.56
Before the Dowell decision, the question of whether a desegregation de-
cree should be terminated was resolved by determining whether the
school system had achieved "unitary" status. Determining the precise
meaning of "unitary" was problematic and rarely did two courts reach the
same definition.57 Curiously, the Dowell Court declined to explain how to
determine when a school system is unitary. The Court's new desegrega-
tion standard makes no mention of the word unitary.8
52. Id. at 18 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
53. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
54. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 397-99 (1980).
55. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
56. Id. at 638. Nevertheless, the school district must continue to be subject to the consti-
tutional prohibition against intentional racial discrimination.
57. See Morgan v. Nacci, 831 F.2d 313, 321 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[U]nitarinessis less a quanti-
fiable 'moment' in the history of a remedial plan than it is the general state of successful
desegregation."); Keyes v. School Dist., 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1516 (D. Colo. 1985), af/'d, 895
F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990) (criticizing the Supreme Court for not defining the meaning of
"unitary."); see also Georgia State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1413 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985) (comparing a unitary school system "which has not operated
segregated schools . . . for a period of several years" with a school system which has
achieved unitary status that "is not only unitary but has eliminated the vestiges of its prior
discrimination .... ").
58. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636. The Court held that it was a mistake "to treat words such
as dual or unitary as if they were actually found in the Constitution." Id.
[Vol. 27:399
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Now that Freeman v. Pitts has been decided, civil rights activists, as
well as political conservatives, look nervously to the future. Those on
both sides of the issue wonder what the effect of Freeman will be on an
estimated eight hundred school systems presently under court-ordered
desegregation."
III. THE IMPACT OF FREEMAN ON FEDERAL COURTS AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. The Role of the Federal Courts
The Court's decision in Freeman v. Pitts"0 will likely result in a
proliferation of cases brought by school districts seeking to end existing
school desegregation orders. The Freeman decision may also encourage
obstinate school districts to further delay achieving meaningful desegre-
gation, while expanding the responsibility of civil rights activists to moni-
tor educational disparities and to bring such matters to the attention of
the courts.
For those federal courts presently supervising school desegregation pro-
grams, Freeman makes it clear that district courts will have greater dis-
cretion and flexibility in allowing incremental desegregation or partial
unitariness.61 In Freeman, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the district
court's ultimate purpose should be to remedy violations and restore con-
trol of school systems to state and local authorities. 2 The Freeman Court
continually emphasized that in determining unitariness, the district
courts must evaluate the school district's record of compliance with re-
gard to the six factors enunciated in Green;63 the term "unitary," how-
ever, has no fixed meaning or content.64
This is precisely what may worry some civil rights activists. Over sixty
percent of lower court federal judges have been appointed by either Ron-
ald Reagan or George Bush.65 Civil rights activists are concerned that
piecemeal unitariness will ultimately whittle away the Brown decision.66
59. See David G. Savage, High Court Eases Busing Standards, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992,
at Al.
60. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
61. Id: at 1445.
62. Id.
63. The Court implicitly outlined six major areas of public school desegregation policy
which would come under the control and supervision of the district courts: student assign-
ment, transportation, physical facilities, extracurricular activities, assignments of teachers
and staff, and allocation of resources. The Court emphasized that the district courts would
retain jurisdiction until state-imposed segregation had been completely removed. 391 U.S.
430, 440-41 n.5 (1968).
64. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1444.
65. Nat Hentoff, Back to Separate But Equal, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1992, at A25.
66. The Reagan administration pointed to public resentment of busing as justification for
turning back the clock on public school desegregation. However, recent studies have shown
1993]
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This view corresponds to the position taken by Justice Marshall in his
dissenting opinion in Dowell.6 1
Justice Marshall sharply criticized the majority for not requiring school
districts to exhaust all viable remedies to achieve desegregation before a
court determines that unitary status has been achieved . 8 Moreover, Jus-
tice Marshall questioned the majority's determination that a school board
had no responsibility to remedy the segregative effects of student assign-
ments caused by shifting demographics.6 9
In keeping with the majority opinion in Dowell, the Freeman Court
minimized the importance of demographic shifting with regard to racial
balancing.7 0 The Freeman Court cited statistics indicating that millions
of Americans move every year and that as -the de jure violation becomes
"more remote in time," and as "demographic changes intervene, it be-
comes less likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a
vestige of the prior de jure system. 7 1 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
suggests that, in a future case, the Court may rewrite the basic standards
that were left intact in Freeman.2 Such a move would make it much eas-
ier for school districts to escape the watchful eye of continued judicial
scrutiny.
Justice Scalia also noted that because of the relationship between
school segregation and residential segregation, the "allocation of the bur-
den of proof foreordains the result in almost all of the 'vestiges of the
past discrimination' cases."'7 3 Moreover, Scalia asserted that if the courts
were to require the plaintiffs to prove that current racial imbalance was
that the majority of the public supports integration. Eighty per cent of those surveyed sup-
port the theory of school integration. Fewer would actually send their children to school on
buses to achieve it, but a majority of those surveyed indicated that they would if it was the
only viable alternative. See American Schools Are Unequal -- Still, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10,
1991, at B2.
67. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 645 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 645-46. Justice Marshall argued that residential segregation must be considered
a vestige of discrimination if previous school board decisions contributed in some way to
segregation. Id.
70. The court wrote:
Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when racial
imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation. Once the racial imbalance
due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to
remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1447 (1992) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971).
71. Id. at 1448. The Court emphatically stated that a federal court, in a desegregation
case, has the discretion to order an incremental or partial withdrawal of supervision and
control. See Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
72. 112 S. Ct. at 1450-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 1452.
[Vol. 27:399
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caused in part by a de jure system, plaintiffs would rarely prevail.7 4 Con-
versely, if school boards were required to establish that racial imbalance
is not attributable to past discrimination, plaintiffs would almost always
prevail.7 5 Although he avoided defining a new legal principle, Justice
Scalia hinted that in the near future, courts would require that the bur-
den of proof be shifted back to the plaintiffs.
76
Interestingly, Justice Souter's concurring opinion expressed an uneasi-
ness with the speedy removal of district court supervision from once-seg-
regated school districts. Justice Souter recognized that while demographic
changes influencing a school's racial composition may have no causal link
to prior de jure segregation, judicial supervision over student assignment
"may still be necessary" to redress underlying vestiges of the unconstitu-
tional dual school system."
Justice Souter's opinion also clarified one of the qualifications in Jus-
tice Kennedy's majority opinion by adding that when gradually releasing
school districts from supervision, federal court judges must be careful
that the remaining vestiges of discrimination do not "act as an incubator
for resegregation in others. '7 8 Because Souter's was a crucial fifth vote,
the majority opinion may have had to adopt a more qualified tone than it
would have otherwise.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, concurred
in the Freeman holding. They did not join Kennedy's opinion on the
grounds that the Court should have required the lower courts to assume a
more thorough reexamination of the reasons most African-American stu-
dents in DeKalb County still attend predominantly black schools.7 9 Jus-
tice Blackmun stated that the district court's supervision over a school
board should continue until the school district has demonstrated full
compliance with constitutionally-mandated desegregation efforts.8 0 In es-
sence, Justice Blackmun encouraged district courts to remain skeptical of
school board attempts to achieve unitary status and to review school
board actions carefully to insure that the board's actions serve to pro-
mote, rather than impede, racial desegregation.8 1 Justice Thomas did not
participate in the decision, which was argued a month before he joined
the Court.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1453.
77. Id. at 1454. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter's opinion is particularly notewor-
thy because his views on desegregation were essentially unknown when the Court agreed two
years ago to hear the case.
78. Id. at 1455.
79. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 1456.
81. Id.
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What standard, then, must federal district court judges apply when de-
termining whether a school district has achieved a unitary status, albeit a
partial one? Arguably, there is no clearly defined standard that the courts
can follow in determining full compliance since eight justices wrote four
separate opinions with no agreement on a single standard. Consequently,
federal courts, at least for the time being, must continue to consider
Green's six factors82 when determining whether a school district has
achieved unitary status.
B. The Effect of Freeman on Public School Districts
Freeman underscores a movement toward returning control of public
education to local authorities.8 3 While the district court maintains the re-
sponsibility of insuring that a school board's actions further accomplish
unitary objectives, the school district must demonstrate a "good-faith" '
commitment to reaching constitutionally sound policies. In Freeman, the
Court found that the Dekalb County School System had designed and
implemented a good-faith desegregation plan and that the plan had es-
sentially accomplished its objectives during its first year of operation. s5
There are still hundreds of public school districts presently under fed-
eral court-ordered desegregation. Freeman indicates that as these schools
gradually meet their goals, in incremental stages, they can be released
from court supervision. Despite "good-faith" efforts, if schools continue
to remain racially unbalanced because of demographics, school districts
will be "under no duty" to remedy the imbalance.8 6 Like the Court in
Dowell, the Freeman Court expressed an intent to require the removal of
discriminating vestiges to the extent practicable.87 Such a mechanical ap-
proach reduces a court's assessment of the Green indicia to quantifying
unitary status and fails to consider the true intent of Brown L
82. See supra note 63.
83. The trend back to local autonomy may be partly due to local concerns about racial
destabilization resulting from white families removing their children from school districts
under court-ordered busing plans. See Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525-26 (4th Cir.)
1986, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
84. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1449. The current judicial focus on ameliorating public school
desegregation has shifted from how to remedy a segregated system as a whole to an assess-
ment of what incremental measures have proven to be successful.
85. Id. at 1447.
86. Id.
87. Board of Education v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991). The Reagan administration
began the short-term view that unitariness is a condition achieved by eliminating the visible
indicia of a segregated system, presumably after a brief period of judicial supervision. A
school system became unitary, with the courts being relieved of their supervisory duties,
once a judicially adequate plan was fully implemented in good-faith. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 21-22, Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.
1986) (No. 84-1815).
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A mechanical approach, as Justice Marshall argued in his dissenting
opinion in Dowell, cannot accurately reflect the intangible stigmata of
segregation.8 Ratios and percentages cannot sufficiently express minority
students' feelings of inferiority or racial prejudice. Unfortunately, the
Freeman Court largely ignored a review of these intangible factors before
granting unitary status to the DCSS.
Significantly, the attorneys who argued this case agree with Scalia's
analysis that the assignment of the burden of proof in desegregation cases
ultimately determines the outcome.8 9 According to Christopher Hansen,
an attorney from the American Civil Liberties Union who represented the
plaintiffs, as a result of Freeman, public school officials will continue to
shoulder the burden of proof in demonstrating that racial imbalance is
not the result of prior de jure segregation. However, Hansen disputes
Scalia's proposal that the passage of time will shift the burden back onto
plaintiffs. 1 Mr. Hansen contends that if the burden were to shift back to
the plaintiffs, this would, in fact, give school districts incentive to delay
compliance and cause to be obstinate.
92
Rex Lee, counsel for the defendants, also agrees with Scalia's analysis.
A former U.S. Solicitor General and currently President of Brigham
Young University, Lee feels that any shifting of the burden of proof must
also be accompanied by good-faith efforts on the school board's part.9 3
C. The Mechanics of Federal Court Withdrawal
Arguably, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion represents a compromise.
As a result of Freeman, courts now have greater latitude in determining
when to relinquish their supervisory role over a school district under a
court-ordered desegregation plan.94 Nevertheless, "[t]he school district
bears the burden of showing that any current [racial] imbalance is not
traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation."9 5 In order to meet
its heavy burden, the school district must not only demonstrate its good-
faith commitment to establishing a unitary system, but must also provide
a record of consistent lawful conduct.9
88. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. See David 0. Stewart, No Exit. Supreme Court Finds No Easy Path to Terminate
Structural Injunctions, 78 A.B.A.J. 49, 51 (1992).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Reiterating its earlier position in Dowell, the Freeman Court emphasized federal
court supervision over a public school system was originally intended as a "temporary mea-
sure." Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445 (1992) (quoting Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636).
95. Id. at 1447.
96. Id. at 1446.
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Even while giving school officials the opportunity to take back control
of their school system from the supervision of the federal courts, the Su-
preme Court issued a warning. Justice Kennedy wrote that it must be
acknowledged that the potential for racial discrimination and hostility
still exists and that its "manifestations may emerge in new and subtle
forms" after "the effects of de jure segregation have been eliminated."9
The states and their operating agencies must "ensure that such forces do
not shape or control the policies of its school systems. Where control lies,
so too does responsibility." '98
Justice Kennedy properly recognized that the Green factors are often
related or interdependent.9 Because of the potential for the Green fac-
tors to act synergistically with one another, a constitutional violation in
one area may not be adequately eliminated unless the court addresses
other areas as well. 10 Justice Kennedy added that when a school district
has not demonstrated good-faith under a comprehensive plan, the school
district would remain under tight judicial supervision. 101
At the same time, the district courts will have to address several issues
that the Freeman Court left unanswered. For example, courts must deter-
mine the relationship of housing patterns to school desegregation. More
importantly, the courts will have to define when a school system has ac-
ted in "good-faith" to achieve unitary status.
IV. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN AMERICA: A RETHINKING OF
EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY
A. The New Face of Public Education
Advocates for a loosening of judicial control over public schools may
well declare the Dekalb County School System the winner in the Supreme
Court's resolution of Freeman. Whether the Court's ruling is a victory for
Dekalb schools - and the children they educate -- largely depends on
what school officials do with the freer hand they are now likely to be
given. Measuring the impact of Freeman v. Pitts on the hundreds of
school desegregation cases that remain alive across the country will take
time. By ruling that compliance with desegregation orders can be
achieved incrementally,' 2 the Court has given school systems an easier
path to remove themselves from court-ordered supervision. Understanda-
bly, this concerns civil rights activists who see a federal judiciary domi-
97. Id. at 1445.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1449.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1450.
102. Id. at 1446.
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nated by conservatives appointed by Ronald Reagan and George Bush.'013
These judges are likely to be more sympathetic to school officials arguing
for a return of local control than to minority parents and students seeking
to remedy the lingering effects of segregation.
But even if they are no longer supervised by the federal courts, public
school systems across America must deal with the issue of race.104 Sociolo-
gists denounce the negative effects of one-race schools on integration.
10 5
Even though state and local laws mandating segregation have been elimi-
nated, the goal of racial integration has not been achieved. 1 6 A study
conducted by the National School Boards Association reveals that 63.3
percent of all African-American school children still attend segregated
schools.'0 A second study suggests that in order for integration to be ef-
fective, court-ordered reassignment of white students is required.108 Other
studies illustrate that the means selected for school integration may not
directly affect student achievement. 10 9
If a given school district cannot have an all-white school system, white
parents and school administrators may attempt to achieve segregation
within the school building's walls. 10 "Tracking" is the most common
method used and is defended by school administrators and parents as an
103. See supra note 42.
104. According to Dr. Gary Orfield of Harvard University, a leading expert on school de-
segregation, approximately 63 percent of African American school children attend primarily
non-white schools. Thirty-two percent of black students are enrolled in public schools that
are 90-100 percent non-white. Orfield adds that 68 percent of Hispanic children, largely
ignored by the courts, are in non-white schools. See, e.g., School Desegregation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of Gary Orfield).
105. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (a mere
showing of unequal spending between districts does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
106. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE UNEQUAL 162
(1992).
107. Id. Mr. Hacker contends that America's failure to resolve racial segregation stems
not only from a lack of political leadership, but is also the result of white families' willing-
ness to accept integration only on a minimal level. Id.
108. Christine H. Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the
Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 71 (1983). Prior to 1970,
few school districts attempted to implement realistic desegregation plans. Id.
109. Meyer Weinberg, The Relationship Between School Desegregation and Academic
Achievement: A Review of the Research, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 241, 269 (1975).
110. HACKER, supra note 106, at 164.
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effective scholastic management tool." Not surprisingly, a student's race
is rarely mentioned under the context of tracking programs." 2
Segregation originally derived its legitimacy from the premise that as a
race, African-Americans were inferior to whites."1 In the public school
setting, segregation was previously used to classify and separate students
according to their race. Admittedly, there is nothing inherently wrong
with classification and separation of school children according to their
scholastic ability."4 The arguments for scholastic segregation are well-
known. How can intellectually gifted high school students expect to gain
admission to prestigious colleges and universities if they are expected to
share classroom time with students that are not as talented? In the peda-
gogical profession, the notion of mixing students of varied educational
preparation is losing ground." 5 Many educators believe that integrating
students of differing educational abilities will ultimately cause talented
students to assist their less talented peers, thereby increasing the learning
capacity of the brighter student. However, it is unlikely that parents
would be willing to take such risks."'
B. A Reemergence of De Facto Segregation?
The existence of racially identifiable schools makes it probable that
race will continue to determine the quality of education children receive.
In Freeman, changes in a school district's demographic makeup moti-
111. Id. Tracking has been heavily criticized from an educational standpoint. See J.
OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY 75, 90, 189 (1985) (stating
that tracking programs perpetuate racial inequalities in society, thereby leading to unequal
educational experiences, particularly in minority children). See also Robin Farmer, U.S.
Will Investigate School Clustering, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 1993, at Al. Two
City of Richmond elementary schools were investigated by the Office for Civil Rights of the
U.S. Department of Education. The city's "clustering" problem involved 74 students - an
equal number of blacks and whites - where all white students in the same grade were put
in the same classes. This practice left many classes all black. The principal of one of the
affected schools contended that white students were clustered for "social and emotional rea-
sons," as allowed by the school board. Id. at A6. Although tracking mechanisms vary among
school districts, one track is usually reserved for academically gifted children while a second
track is used to place scholastically marginal children.
112. HACKER, supra note 106, at 164. Mr. Hacker believes that African-American school
children are more likely to be placed in the lower - and slower - academic tracks. Id.
113. Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Uni-
tary Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1105, 1124 (1990).
114. The classification and separation of school children is not per se unconstitutional.
Courts have approved this scholastic management practice in some instances. See, e.g.,
Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 854 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1988) (indi-
cating that the separation of students according to academic potential in English and math-
ematics was permissible even though segregated classrooms resulted).
115. HACKER, supra note 106, at 164.
116. Id.
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vated the Supreme Court to establish a piecemeal unitary standard.1 17
However, any changes in a given school district's demography necessarily
includes influences of de facto segregation. Studies based on tracing cen-
sus tracts have indicated that white families begin moving out of neigh-
borhoods once the African-American population reaches a level between
10 and 20 percent.'1 8 This phenomenon occurs even if the African-Ameri-
can families have similar socioeconomic status as the white families."
9
What factors, then, are responsible for motivating white families into
moving from these neighborhoods once an African-American family
moves next door? For many Americans, African-Americans, in general,
are associated with drug abuse, criminal activity, residential deterioration
and low educational attainment. 2 ' Regardless of one's achievements or
professional work ethic, African-Americans may be seen by some whites
as lowering the social status of a white neighborhood, simply on the basis
of skin color.
One commentator has proposed that an appropriate judicial test for de-
termining a school district's unitary status would combine the six Green
factors with an in-depth analysis of community attitudes towards racially
identifiable schools.' 2' This proposal is fundamentally sound. In evaluat-
ing whether a school system has achieved unitary status in one, two, or all
of the Green areas,"' a district court should hear subjective testimony
from minority group teachers, administrators, students and parents -
the community at large.
Given the persistence of non-white public schools and general doubts
about Brown's sociological theories, many educators have been actively
searching for viable solutions to America's public school dilemma. Indeed,
a rethinking of educational equality must first take place before substan-
tial reform can follow. In light of Freeman, individual school districts will
have to design and implement programs that can adequately accommo-
date the dynamics of a constantly changing population.1 23
117. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1143-38. (1992).
118. See HACKER, supra note 106, at 37-38.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 38.
121. William L. Christopher, Note, Ignoring the Soul of Brown: Board of Education v.
Dowell, 70 N.C. L. REV. 615, 636 (1992).
122. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
123. A full discussion of the issues underlying America's effort to revitalize its public
school educational programs, and the effects that racial integration will likely have on these
programs, exceeds the scope of this paper. Several innovative programs have been proposed
to accommodate the change in racial composition in America's major urban areas. Programs
such as magnet schools, which offer special curricula to attract racially mixed student bod-
ies, have shown great promise. Another innovative program proposes the development of
Afrocentric curricula for children attending predominantly African-Black schools. See Sonia
R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285 (1992).
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V. CONCLUSION
For public school systems across the country, Freeman will provide lo-
cal officials with the opportunity to take control of their schools back
from the federal courts. In loosening the grip of judicial control over
school desegregation matters, the Court essentially disregarded Brown's
promise. The Court cannot hope for equal educational opportunity for all
Americans if it continues to ignore the destructiveness of racism.
Now that this nation has a new President in Bill Clinton, a Democrat,
civil rights activists are hopeful that a compromise can be forged between
the holding in cases like Freeman and the reasoning of Brown I. In many
cases, the federal courts should defer to school district decisions, but only
if equal educational opportunity and integration are not jeopardized. A
court's determination of unitariness does not give school districts un-
restricted license to vitiate prior desegregation efforts, just short of violat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause.124
For most Americans, the road to increased employment opportunity
and social mobility is clearly defined by a quality education, one that can-
not be hampered by substandard learning facilities or resources. Govern-
ment policy-makers, school officials and concerned citizens must realize
that to make America work, equal education opportunity for all must
never again take a back seat. In this regard, school board decisions should
remain unimpaired with two notable exceptions. First, the federal courts
should impose mandatory hearings whenever a school board proposes a
new reassignment plan.125 The school district's pre-unitary, court-ordered
directives must be scrutinized and evaluated against all categories to in-
sure furtherance of integration and equal opportunity.1 26 Second, a
mandatory public hearing should be conducted after each official U.S.
Census to evaluate the cumulative effect of school board decisions in rela-
tion to demographic change.1 27
Although these measures would require the courts to assume a quasi-
regulatory function, the end result would substantially reduce the amount
of litigation and would further enhance the public's trust in desegregation
measures. Recurrent evaluation of school board decisions would also ad-
dress the concerns of racial minorities, while simultaneously strengthen-
ing the credibility of school board decisions.
The federal government and the courts must realize that effective
desegregative efforts require vigilance and patience. Those with the re-
124. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
125. Theodore E. Karatinos, Price v. Austin Independent School District: Segregation's
Unitary Tar Baby, 77 WEsT's EDUC. L. REP. 15 (1992).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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sponsibility for determining the course our public schools will take must
now be willing to make the difficult decisions necessary to achieve an in-
tegrated school system.
Frank H. Stubbs, III

